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Explaining the factors behind the use of populism in European media 
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Introduction 
Against the background of the variation in populism between countries exposed in the previous 
chapter by Blassnig et al., this chapter will focus on article, newspaper, and country-level 
explanatory factors for this variation. Evidence for between-newspaper variation with respect 
to populist communication has already been presented elsewhere (Manucci & Weber, 2017; 
Rooduijn, 2014; Wettstein et al., 2018). The role of the press in a political climate of 
intensifying conflict among European democracies, especially in relation to financial bailouts 
for EU member states and the EU’s response to migration pressure, to name a few, has been 
criticized (Sarikakis, 2012). For instance, Tomov and Raycheva (2018) assert that for Bulgaria, 
populist messages are widely disseminated in the media, especially during the migrant crisis 
and periods of instability. They conclude that the media disseminate populist messages without 
the necessary criticism, not seeking different points of view on the subject. Due to the 
emergence and establishment of populist parties in the political field of virtually all European 
democracies, political communicators might cultivate a populist discourse in the public sphere 
which would then also be reflected in the degree of populism in newspapers. 
 Furthermore, existing theoretical accounts of populism and the media have suggested 
that we must distinguish between two forms of populist discourse in media coverage: First, 
populist messages stemming from political actors who communicate through the media thereby 
using the media as a communication channel for their ideas, and, second, populism voiced by 
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media actors themselves. For the former, Esser, Stepinska and Hopmann (2017) have coined 
the term “populism through the media”, and for the latter, “populism by the media”. Mazzoleni 
(2008) has argued that we can speak of “media populism” when journalists create populist 
messages themselves – and thus become much more proactive than merely transmitting the 
populist statements of political actors. 
 The aim of the chapter is to explore the weight of factors that may help us to explain 
varying levels of populist communication within and between countries and newspapers, such 
as journalistic culture of a country, editorial mission of a medium, or style of an article. We 
work with the same content analysis data as already presented in the previous chapter by 
Blassnig et al. However, we will limit ourselves to the spring 2017 data (and leave aside the 
spring 2016 data) because we had a slightly larger number of countries in the sample in spring 
2017. The following analyses are based on 762 news stories and 632 opinion pieces published 
in 34 newspapers from ten western and eastern European countries between February and April 
2017. For more information on the type of stories and newspapers analyzed, and for more 
information on our operationalization of populism and exact methodical approach, we refer to 
the detailed information given in the preceding chapter of this book, by Blassnig et al. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Potential Factors Influencing Populism in the News Media 
While scholars have theorized about populism and the media (Mazzoleni 2003, 2007; 
Esser, Stepinska, & Hopmann 2017; Krämer 2014), empirical investigations into the impact of 
potential factors on the proportion of populist statements in media coverage have remained 
rare. Furthermore, such studies have concentrated on relatively few variables. For instance, 
while several have dwelled on the difference between tabloids and broadsheets, hardly any 
studies considered additional factors such as the political leaning of a medium, the journalistic 
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culture in a country, or characteristics of a news story (Akkerman 2011, Bos, van den Brug, & 
de Vreese 2010, Manucci & Weber 2017, Rooduijn 2014, Raycheva & Peicheva 2017). 
Building on previous work, the present analysis includes explanatory variables at three levels 
of analysis –countries, news outlets, and articles – to provide a more comprehensive account 
of what causes variation in the degree of populism in media coverage (see also the introduction 
to this book).  
In the following, we first identify different influencing factors based on three theoretical 
perspectives. We then develop and subsequently test our hypotheses using correlation analyses 
and multi-level regression analyses. The strength of this study lies in the fact that we work with 
a larger sample of newspapers and countries than has been common in previous research on 
populism in the media. 
Country-level: Journalistic culture (macro level). The first macro-level factor we 
wish to consider here is the journalistic culture in a country. Mass-mediated populist messages 
selected or produced by journalists might be favored by the media’s built-in antagonism to 
political elites, which sometimes even borders on cynicism (Esser et al. 2017; Brants et al. 
2011). According to this line of argument, an adversarial attitude of journalists towards political 
elites and their corresponding drive to behave as advocates of the common people, would 
produce an anti-establishment bias in the news. A general cynical attitude towards political 
actors could make journalists more open to using populist messages, especially during crises. 
As a counter-argument one could offer the alternative view that the media in many countries 
serve more as a guard dog (than a watchdog) of the ruling political and economic order, and 
should therefore be regarded as part of the establishment itself – even if they may still 
occasionally criticize individual representatives of the elite (Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 
1995) – an argument also often put forward by political actors who criticize the media as part 
of the system. According to this alternative view, we would expect the media to carry few 
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populist messages. High degrees of anti-elitism would be particularly unusual since, in this 
perspective, the elite is generally backed, not blamed. In any case, the orientation of the media 
towards political actors cannot be treated as a side issue when it comes to analyzing populism. 
This orientation is rooted in journalistic cultures acting at the national level (Hanitzsch et al., 
2011). 
 Journalistic culture is thus among the macro-level factors that could account for 
different levels of populism in the media. Political coverage, institutional role conceptions – 
and especially the self-perceptions of political reporters – are an important element of 
journalistic culture. They define the journalists’ primordial professional goals. In other words, 
role conceptions condition journalists’ approaches to covering politics, and thus influences 
their style of reporting. Comparative studies have identified key differences in the impact of 
journalists' role conceptions in the media systems of European democracies (Pfetsch, Maurer, 
& Mayerhöffer 2014). Journalists’ self-perceptions of their role can oscillate between (i) 
adversarial and (ii) monitorial, or even supportive/collaborative roles in their relationship to 
political actors, and between (iii) pedagogical-ethical and (iv) market-oriented roles in their 
relationship to the public. In political journalism especially, the question about which is the 
dominant role conception, affects the way news stories and opinion pieces are written, 
including the decision about if and what populist messages should be included in news 
coverage. 
 In particular, the predominance of adversarial, collaborative, pedagogical, and market-
oriented role conceptions in a country can be expected to influence the relationship of the media 
and the political elite and, by implication, the consideration of populist discourse in journalists’ 
stories. These four roles correspond to the interventionism, power distance, and market 
orientation dimensions of journalism culture (Hanitzsch, 2011). First, a collaborative role 
conception pushes journalists to act as an extension of political parties, which indicates low 
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power distance. For instance, a journalistic culture that sees high value in supporting political 
institutions will hardly produce media that critically scrutinize or openly repudiate politicians’ 
statements. Rather, one can expect the media to include large parts of official political 
statements, relatively unfiltered and unquestioned, in their reporting. This allows us to 
formulate our first hypothesis: The more dominant collaborative and supportive role 
conceptions are in the political journalism of a certain country, the more “populism through 
the media” we can we expect in news stories (H1a). 
 Notwithstanding the argument above, a collaborative role orientation can also lead 
journalists to a critical attitude toward populist parties and their messages if established 
political forces are resolutely ‘anti-populist’. Thus, since leading media are usually on the side 
of established parties, they tend to criticize populist parties and try to reserve the public sphere 
for their allies’ messages. This behavior entails blocking populist messages, at least when they 
come from new challengers, with the aim to help the non-populist parties. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis might be dependent on the strength of political parallelism between non-populist, 
established parties, and leading media. 
 Journalists who are less willing to convey the arguments and adopt the frames put 
forward by political elites, can be expected to be more distant and often more adversarial 
toward political power. They tend to embrace a watchdog role rather than the role of 
disseminator of politicians’ messages. Such a journalistic culture at times pushes journalists to 
hold political elites publicly accountable, which can mean to admonish and reprimand them or 
their policies in articles that express the journalist’s own voice. Therefore, we can formulate a 
second hypothesis, especially pertaining to opinion pieces: The more deeply entrenched 
adversarial role conceptions are in the culture of political journalism of a certain country, the 
more “populism of the media” we can expect in opinion pieces (H 1b). 
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 On the other hand, in journalistic cultures characterized by a strong influence of 
pedagogical role perceptions, journalists see themselves as educators, guardians and conveyers 
of certain values. Those journalists score highly on the interventionism dimension since they 
pursue a particular mission. Most often, these are liberal values such as tolerance, appreciation 
of ethnic diversity, and cosmopolitism. These views are not in line with major parts of populist 
thought and with communication that focuses on national identity, the (native) people, and their 
delineation from outgroups. Hence, journalists adopting a pedagogical role are expected to 
filter out populist communications by sources, or to contextualize them in line with a social-
responsibility ideal of journalism, and to be careful to avoid any populist discourse themselves.  
 This gate-keeping process may reduce the level of populism that political actors can 
infuse into media coverage compared to countries with a less pedagogical, more collaborative 
or adversarial journalistic culture. Hence, we expect: The more dominant pedagogical role 
conceptions are in a country, the less likely journalists will be to include populist 
communication elements in news stories and opinion pieces (H1c). 
 Last but not least, a strong drive in journalistic culture to accommodate the taste of the 
target-audience – in other words, the enhanced goal to produce stories that elicit broad interest 
and attention and ‘sell’ – could render journalists more likely to allow populist statements to 
slip into their coverage. This is known as a market-oriented role perception. This understanding 
of the journalistic role has become even more tempting in the online age where media strive to 
attract views and clicks with hyped-up headlines and provocative story leads. So, if the political 
journalists in a country as a group have internalized a strong audience orientation as a 
professional leitmotif, there is a high chance that the media will display an enhanced degree of 
populist communication in news stories and opinion pieces, given that the elements of 
populism usually attract eye-balls. From this follows our fourth hypothesis: The more dominant 
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market-oriented role conceptions are, the more populist communication journalists will 
include in news articles and opinion pieces (H1d). 
Outlet-level: Editorial mission (meso level). Below the country level, at the meso-
level of media organizations, newspapers are not completely similar with respect to how they 
cover political affairs. For instance, newspapers differ in their market orientation – that is, 
which groups in the reader market they want to address – and which editorial styles and 
strategies they use to win these groups over. In short, they differ in their editorial missions. 
Different editorial missions are particularly evident in the contrast between tabloid newspapers 
(targeting the mass-market) and broadsheets or quality newspapers (targeting better educated, 
up-market segments of the readership). Tabloids may define what voters should know to 
evaluate a person’s fitness for public office very differently to how broadsheets might (Esser, 
1999). The term tabloid refers more to a journalistic style than to a page format. A main 
criterion for delineating quality-oriented broadsheets from tabloids is an inclination of the latter 
towards gut issues and topics involving sleaze, scandal, sensation, human-interest and 
entertainment. These topics are supposed to sell better than the substance-heavy topics of the 
more serious-minded broadsheets. 
 Mazzoleni (2014) attributes to tabloids, an important role in the spread of populism. He 
perceives two mechanisms at play: First, against the background of their readership, popular 
media like to present themselves as advocate of the common citizen, which echoes the claim 
of populist politicians to represent the interests of the common people. Second, in order to 
achieve the greatest possible attention and impact, tabloids attempt to make politics more 
palatable and accessible. They do so by stirring up emotions, articulating outrage, serving 
stereotypes, and exploiting news values. Quality newspapers, on the other hand, are said to 
largely dispense with populism because their values and interests are more in line with those 
of the traditional elite (Mazzoleni 2008; Donohue, Tichenor, & Olien, 1995). 
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 However, research by Akkerman (2011), Bos and Brants (2014), and Rooduijn (2014) 
found no evidence for the assumption that tabloids publish significantly more populist content. 
However, it should be noted that Rooduijn (2014) used a more restrictive definition of populism 
and focused exclusively on opinion articles, while Akkerman (2011) and Bos and Brants’ 
(2014) samples included a small number of mild tabloids. Therefore, the question can hardly 
be considered settled as yet. Above all, because Wettstein and colleagues (2018) recently 
discovered, in a ten-country study, that tabloid newspapers have a stronger propensity for 
people-centrist and anti-elitist bias in news reporting than in broadsheets, this confirmed the 
assumptions of Mazzoleni (2008, 2014) and Krämer (2014). In view of these discrepancies, we 
feel compelled to investigate systematically the extent to which different levels of populism in 
media coverage can be attributed to differences between a mass-market and up-market 
orientation of newspapers.  First, we will investigate the initial assumption: Mass-market 
newspapers feature more populist communication in news stories than up-market newspapers 
(H2a). 
 We also want to investigate whether the different editorial missions of tabloids and 
qualities are also reflected in how much populism the two newspaper types publish in their 
commentaries. In this respect, Mazzoleni (2014) argues that tabloids are consciously 
amplifying populism to show their allegiance to the sentiment of the masses. Tabloids would 
thus become accomplices of populist movements, while quality newspapers are the safe-
guardians of the political establishment. If this assertion is true, mass-market newspapers 
should take a much stronger and more frequent populist stance in their comments on political 
affairs, than the elite-oriented up-market newspapers. Our hypothesis states: We will find more 
populist communication in commentaries of mass-market newspapers than in those of up-
market newspapers (H2b). 
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 Furthermore, the political leaning is another important component of a newspapers’ 
editorial mission. Since right-wing populism emerged as the dominant form of this movement 
in most countries under study (with the potential exceptions of France, Italy and Greece where 
left-leaning populist movements were equally strong) at the time of study, we assume that right-
leaning newspapers may be more receptive to populist statements than neutral or left-leaning 
newspapers. Hence: We will find more populist communication in news stories and 
commentaries in right-leaning newspapers than in those of neutral/left-leaning newspapers 
(H2c). 
Outlet-level: News Logic. While some journalistic cultures and editorial missions may 
provide more favorable, and others less favorable, opportunity structures for using populist 
communication in media coverage, these are not the only factors to be considered. Another 
facilitator of populism-infused newspaper coverage is the extent to which articles follow a 
certain media logic. Mazzoleni (2008, 2014) argues that there is a congruence between forms 
of news media logic, and populist logic. For instance, blaming elites or outgroups for (alleged 
or real) wrongdoings, meets the criteria of news media logic due to the inherent negativity of 
the accompanying rhetoric. Unfortunately, there is very little empirical research on this 
connection, but based on prevailing theoretical assumptions (Mazzoleni, 2008, 2014) we 
expect that populism will encounter great publication opportunities in those newspaper articles 
that are written in a particularly dramatic, emotional, polarizing, and negative way. These 
characteristics of news media logic correspond to a widespread populist style (Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007; Block & Negrine, 2017). Since populists often use Manichean narratives, they 
resort to polarizing and emotional language, and dramatization. The vicinity of news media 
logic and populist style leads us to the next hypothesis: News stories and commentaries that 
use the journalistic style elements of polarization, negativity, emotionality and drama, increase 
the chance that they also contain populist messages (H3). 
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 Furthermore, populist parties have a special relationship with two political issues across 
Europe, namely EU affairs, and immigration. In southern European countries such as Greece, 
Spain and Italy, left-leaning populist movements emerged from the organized resistance and 
mass protests against EU austerity policy (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014; Kioupkiolis, 
2016). In Germany, the Alternative fuer Deutschland was founded as a populist party opposing 
the EU bailout, and later started to oppose Merkel’s immigration policy. In other countries, 
opposition to European integration (e.g., in Poland) and opposition to immigration (e.g., in 
Norway, Serbia) are also part of the core populist beliefs. In France and Switzerland, populists 
campaign on both these issues simultaneously; the Front National and the Swiss People’s Party 
strive to ‘own’ the issues of immigration and EU affairs and are convinced that citizens’ 
opinion is on their side in this regard. For these reasons, populists in the respective countries 
focus their public communication efforts systematically on these topics (Boomgaarden & 
Vliegenthart, 2007). We thus expect: News articles that feature EU affairs as major topics in 
addition to immigration, contain more populist communication (H4a). And: Opinion articles 
that deal with the issues of immigration and European integration as their main topics, contain 
more populist communication (H4b). To give the reader a better overview, we have 





Table 6.1 Overview of hypotheses 
Journalistic Culture (country-/macro-level) 
- Collaborative and supportive role conception 
- Adversarial role conception 
- Pedagogical role conception 







More populist communication in news & commentary (H 1a) 
More populist communication in commentary (H 1b) 
Less populist communication in news & commentary (H 1c) 
More populist communication in news & commentary (H 1d) 
Editorial Mission (outlet-/meso-level) 




More populist communication in news (H 2a) and 
commentary (H 2b) 
- Right-wing political leaning   More populist communication in news and commentary (H 
2c) 
News Logic (outlet-/meso-level) 
- Style elements of negativity, emotionality, 
polarization, dramatization 






More populist communication in news & commentary (H 3) 
 
More populist communication in news (H 4a) and 
commentary (H 4b) 
 
Method 
The study design and basic descriptive results are described in the previous chapter by 
Blassnig et al. The focus here is on the measures and additional contextual factors used in this 
chapter, and they refer the reader back to the previous chapter for further methodological 
information. 
Dependent Variable  
 To measure the extent of populist communication in European newspapers, we use an 
index. However, the index we use in this chapter is slightly different from the index used in the 
other two content analysis-based chapters in this volume by Blassnig et al. and Esser et al. The 
reason for this deviation is that more advanced statistical analyses is used in this chapter, which 
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places higher demands on the dependent variable. Our dependent measure considers all 12 key 
populist messages separately and combines them in a sum index. Our index can therefore vary 
from 0 to 12. Each type of key message could only be counted once in the same article, except 
if the speaker or the target of that key message changed in that article. More details on how we 
coded the key messages are given in the previous chapter by Blassnig et al. 
Since our index does not reflect the absolute number of individual populist messages 
used, but how many different types of key messages were included in articles, the empirical 
range is far below the theoretical maximum of 12. Empirically, we found that the European 
newspapers under study used between 0 and 5 different types of populist key messages per 
article. Furthermore, our dependent variable allows us to recognize the source of a key 
message, for instance whether it was a politician or the journalist writing the article. As 
mentioned, we distinguish between two types of story samples: immigration news coverage on 
one hand, and opinion pieces, irrespective of the topic, on the other (see the chapter by Blassnig 
et al. for details). 
Independent variables 
 Journalistic culture (country-/macro-Level). Role perceptions are part of the 
journalistic culture. We are very grateful to Thomas Hanitzsch, who kindly allowed us to work 
with the variables from his Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS, see 
www.worldsofjournalism.org for more details). The countries included in our content analysis 
are also included in his survey of journalist populations – except for Poland, which we can 
therefore no longer consider in this chapter. Because the WJS team had recorded journalists' 
role conceptions prior to our content analysis, these role conceptions can be regarded as 
potential explanatory variables for the media content examined (in the sense that a potential 
cause must precede its effect). It is important to mention that this analysis will only use the 
answers of those journalists who work in the field of “political journalism”; these journalists 
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are most likely to be entrusted with the kind of news stories, political commentaries, and 
populist topics that we examined in our content analysis. To put it differently: the subgroup of 
WJS respondents we use here is, structurally, most similar to the writers of the newspaper 
articles we investigated in our content analysis.1  
The journalists’ views of their roles were aggregated at the country level, since these 
role perceptions are seen as expressions of national journalism cultures (or more precisely, as 
expressions of certain dimensions of national journalism cultures; see Hanitzsch, 2011). Here 
follows some information on how the WJS team measured these role concepts in their 
questionnaire. The collaborative role corresponds with the wish to be a “supporter of the 
government”. The adversarial role conception reflects the opposite attitude and unites all those 
demonstrating a critical distance toward political power holders and authorities by describing 
themselves as "adversaries of the government". The third relevant orientation toward politics 
is the pedagogical role: these journalists wish to “promote tolerance” or “educate citizens”. The 
fourth role perception expresses a strong market orientation, meaning that journalists see it as 
their primary task to cater to the tastes of the masses. It is reflected in a desire to “provide the 
kind of news that attracts the largest audience”. 
 News logic and editorial mission (outlet-/meso-level). When composing the media 
sample, we had already ensured that, wherever possible, we would select newspapers in each 
country that are both more left-wing, and more right-wing, in political terms, as well as 
newspapers that are both more up-market, and more down-market, oriented. The final selection 
decision was left to the country experts represented in Work Group 2 of our COST Action, 
who co-authored the three content analysis chapters in this book. We have used the frequent 
meetings of our working group to discuss the selection decisions and to standardize the 
evaluation standards created for this purpose (for details and outlets sampled, see the chapter 
by Blassnig et al.). 
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 Article style (story level).  The article style was determined, independent of populist 
key messages, on the story level, meaning that the whole article was evaluated before a code 
for its style was assigned. ‘Negativity’ was assessed by whether the story had an overall 
negative tone towards politics, including political actors. ‘Dramatization’ measured if a 
situation was described as exceptional by the excessive use of dramatized labels and 
superlatives. ‘Polarization’ measured whether the article presented a situation as polarized 
between two diametrically opposed attitudes toward an issue as if there was only ‘black’ and 
‘white’. ‘Emotionalization’ measured whether the article referred to the speaker’s feelings, the 
feelings of persons or groups featured in the article, or made use of an emotional reporting 
style. The originally used, more differentiated measuring scales, were recoded into 
dichotomous variables (1=present, 0=not present) for this analysis. 
Data Structure and Analysis 
 We use correlation and regression analysis to test our hypotheses. Because our data has 
a multilevel structure, the regression analysis must account for that. A common rationale for 
using multi-level models is to ensure that the estimates are trustworthy and not overly 
optimistic in finding non-null effects (McNeish, Stapleton, & Silverman, 2016). The news 
stories and commentaries are clustered in media outlets which are themselves clustered in 
countries. At the second level, i.e. the level of media outlets, we have 36 newspapers, 12 of 
which are mass-market newspapers and 24 are up-market newspapers. Moreover, the 
newspapers are nested in 12 European countries which, theoretically, form the third and highest 
level of analysis. 
 However, since we are dealing with 11 countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, France, 
Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland, UK), it is impractical to include 
the country-level as the third level in a multi-level model since the number is too low (see 
Snijders & Bosker, 1999; but also see the chapter by Hameleers et al. in this volume). 
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Therefore, we will construct multi-level models with newspapers defined as Level 2, and 
articles as Level1 units. That means, hypotheses relating to the news organization (H2a – b) 
test factors at Level 2, and hypotheses relating to the article (H3, H4a – b) are tested at Level 
1 in a multi-level model. The hypotheses related to the country (H1a – d) are tested separately 
with a correlation analysis and only for information purpose in an additional multi-level 
analysis where the countries are defined as Level 2.  
 
Results 
Effects of Journalistic Culture on Populism in the Media (Country-Level) 
 With respect to journalistic role perceptions, the correlation analysis mainly supports 
the hypotheses. These results however must be interpreted with caution, since the number of 
cases ranges between only 8 and 11. Nonetheless, a few trends can be detected. First, in the 
news stories sample, a collaborative and supportive journalistic culture correlates with higher 
degrees of populism through the media, i.e. the average number of populist statements voiced 
by political actors (r = .60, p < .05). In other words, a collaborative and supportive journalistic 
culture tends to co-occur with a more permissive attitude to populism stemming from political 
actors. This finding is in line with H1a. 
 Second, H1b assumed that an adversarial journalistic culture would go hand in hand 
with more populism in commentaries. This is confirmed by a positive correlation for the goal 
“monitor and scrutinize political leaders” (r = .71, p < .05) and for the goal “be an adversary 
of the government” (r = .40, p = .24). 
 Third, a pedagogical role conception is indeed correlated with significantly less populist 
communication by journalists in immigration news stories (r = -.75, p < .05 for the item 
“educate the audience”, and r = -.37, p > .05 for the item “promote tolerance and cultural 
diversity”). The degree of populism through the media is unaffected by a pedagogical culture, 
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though. The predominance of a pedagogical role perception in a country is also correlated with 
less populism by journalists in opinion pieces (r = -.51, p = .15 for “educate audience”). So, 
overall, H1c is supported as well. 
 Fourth, there is a positive correlation between the goal to cater to the preferences of the 
audience, and the occurrence of populist messages of any type in immigration news stories in 
a country (r = .54). This is in line with the H1d, albeit there is no significant relationship.2 
These relationships are weaker in the opinion piece sample. 
 Overall, we can conclude that the predominance of certain role perceptions has a non-
negligible influence on the degree of populism in the news coverage.3 
Effects of News Logic and Editorial Mission (Story Level) on Immigration Coverage 
 Furthermore, we hypothesized that strong elements of news logic and the issue context 
of EU integration (H3 and H4a) in an article, increased the presence of populist key messages 
– our dependent variable – in a news story. To test this, we used multi-level regression models; 
they consider the clustered structure of our data when estimating the effects, and separate the 
variance in populism that lies between the articles (Level 1) and between the newspapers (Level 
2). As it is shown by the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC) of the first, “empty” model 
(Table 6.2, Model 1), approximately 11 percent of the variance of populism lies between the 
newspapers. 
 Next, in Model 2 (Table 6.2), indicators of news logic are entered as fixed effects at 
Level 1 into the regression. As central elements of news logic, we test the effects of negativity, 
dramatization, polarization, and emotionalization. We assume them to have positive effects on 
the degree of populism (H3). Indeed, emotionalization, negativity, polarization, and 
dramatization all have significant, positive effects on the variety of populist key messages in 
immigration news stories (Table 6.2). The strongest effects come from negativity and 
polarization. The issue context also has the expected effect: A dummy indicating that an 
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immigration-related news story is additionally concerned with EU affairs, has a positive effect 
which is in line with H4a.  
 The significant random effect of the intercept in Model 2 (Table 6.2) calls for testing 
the effects of explanatory factors located at the level of the newspapers (Level 2). To this end, 
we ran a means-as-outcomes model (Model 3, Table 6.2) in which we tested the fixed effect of 
a newspapers’ market-orientation (“mass-market” coded 1, “up-market” coded 0) and political 
leaning (“right” coded 1, “neutral & left” coded 0).4 Remember, we hypothesized that a mass-
market orientation and a leaning to the political right would enhance populism in the articles 
of that newspaper. However, while both variables certainly do explain some variance of the 
intercept between the newspapers (Pseudo R2 = 11,4%), their respective effects fail to reach 
significance, suggesting that neither has a substantial influence on the degree of populism in 





Table 6.2 Factors explaining populism in news stories (MLA, Level 2: Newspaper) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects    
Grand Mean (Intercept) .543*** -.904*** .497*** 
Level 1    
Style: Negativity    .335*** - 
Style: Drama    .228*** - 
Style: Polarization   .331** - 
Style: Emotion  .141* - 
Topic: “Europe”  .132* - 
Level 2 (Newspaper)    
Tabloid  - -.112 
Right leaning  -  .124 
Random parameters    
Level 1 variance: σ2(within) 0.575*** 0.485*** .567*** 
Level 2 variance: σ2(Between) 0.073** 0.077** .051*** 
R2(within)  .171***  
R2(between)  - .114 
ICC 0.113 0.116 0.093 
N Level 1 762 762 762 
N Level 2 36 36 36 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent variable: Populist communication (scale 
from 0 – 12). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; (*) p < .1 
 
 Country as Level 2 Unit. To account for the fact that our data is nested in three layers 
(countries, newspapers, articles) and given that the previous models neglected the highest level 
of nesting (i.e., the country), we also fitted multi-level regression models where the 11 
countries were defined as Level 2-units. Due to the low number of countries, we consider the 





Table 6.3 Factors explaining populism in news stories (MLA, Level 2: Country) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects    
Grand Mean (Intercept) .543*** -.898*** .084 
Level 1    
Style: Negativity    .324*** - 
Style: Drama    .304*** - 
Style: Polarization   .345** - 
Style: Emotion  .158* - 
Topic: “EU Affairs”  .126* - 
Level 2 (Country)     
Role: Support Govt.  - .129 
Role: Educate Audience  - -.276* 
Role: Cater to Audience  -    .417*** 
Role: Adversary of Govt  - -.013 
Random parameters    
Level 1 variance: σ2(within)  0.584*** 0.490***    .598*** 
Level 2 variance: σ2(Between) 0.083(*) 0.093(*) .011 
R2(within)  .176*** - 
R2(between)  - .784*** 
ICC 0.124 0.135 0.078 
N Level 1 762 762 553 
N Level 2 12 12 9 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent variable: Populist communication (scale 
from 0 – 12). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; (*) p < .1 
 
The fixed effects of the news logic indicators in the random intercept model (Model 2, Table 
6.3) are similar to the first regression confirming the robustness of the results. Importantly, the 
model also shows that a substantial amount of variance of populism in news articles lies at the 
level of the countries (σ2 (Between) = .093, p < .1) which suggests testing the effect of explanatory 
factors at Level 2 with a means-as-outcomes model. Yet, results for the effect of country-level 
factors must be interpreted with caution, since we could only include between nine and 11 
countries in the analysis, which is too few to calculate robust results. According to H1a, a 
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collaborative role perception, and to according to H 1d, a market-oriented role perception is 
both expected to increase the degree of populism, while H1c assumed that a pedagogical role 
perception dampens populism in news stories. 
 Model 3 (Table 6.3) shows that a journalistic culture driven by the market-oriented role 
perception indeed increases the presence of populist key messages used by journalists in that 
country’s immigration news coverage. This is in line with H1d. On the other side, a journalistic 
culture with a strong pedagogical role perception limits inclination to use populist messages in 
news – as is indicated by the negative effect of the coefficient. Hence, H1c is also supported. 
However, neither the supportive nor the adversarial role perception seems to influence 
populism in the news. 
 Altogether, we can draw the conclusion from these analyses that news logic, along with 
the journalistic culture, matters for the degree of populism in immigration news coverage, while 
editorial mission in terms of market-orientation or political leaning of a newspaper does not. 
Effects of News Logic and Editorial Mission (Story Level) on Opinion Piece Sample  
 We turn now to the opinion piece sample (632 items from 34 newspapers). We 
hypothesized analogously to the news articles that the same elements of news logic and the 
same issue contexts – EU affairs and immigration – would spur populism in commentaries 
(Level 1). The intra-class correlation coefficient from the empty model shows that a non-
negligible 16.6 percent of the variation in the dependent variable lies between the newspapers, 
suggesting that there are variables at Level 2 at play. In our hypotheses H2b and H2c, we 
assumed that the editorial mission in terms of market orientation and the political leaning of 
the newspaper have effects on the occurrence of populism in commentaries. We thus tested 
these as potential Level 2 explanatory factors. 
 The fixed effects of the Level 1 predictors negativity, dramatization, polarization, and 
emotionalization, all have a significant and boosting effect on the degree of populist 
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communication. The strongest effects stem from negativity and dramatization. However, 
whether or not immigration or EU affairs are the main topics of a commentary is irrelevant for 
that matter. Hence, while H3 is again supported, H4b must be rejected. Furthermore, we find 
that neither the mass-market vs. up-market difference, nor the political leaning, had any effect 
on the extent of populism in a commentary (Table 6.4, Model 3). 
 Furthermore, we again fitted a means-as-outcomes model in which countries were 
defined as Level 2 for informational purposes (not shown as table). It indicates the effects of 
the journalistic role perceptions on populism in the commentaries. The strongest effect stems 
from the educational role and is negative, as expected, thereby further supporting H1c. 
Adversarial and supportive roles both have a weaker, positive effect which is also in line with 





Table 6.4 Factors explaining populism in opinion pieces (MLA, Level 2: Newspaper) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Fixed Effects    
Grand Mean (Intercept) 0.907*** -1.011***  .870*** 
Level 1    
Topic “Immigration”  -.023 - 
Topic “EU affairs”  .086 - 
Style: Negativity     .501*** - 
Style: Drama     .359*** - 
Style: Polarization   .274* - 
Style: Emotion   .159* - 
Level 2     
Right-leaning  - .179 
Tabloid  - -.032 
Random parameters    
Level 1 variance: σ2(within) 0.766*** 0.641*** 0.766*** 
Level 2 variance: σ2(Between) 0.152*** 0.095*** 0.146*** 
R2 (within)  .215*** - 
R2 (between)  - .051 
ICC 0.166 0.104 0.168 
N Level 1 632 632 632 
N Level 2 34 34 34 
Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients. Dependent variable: Populist communication (scale 
from 0 – 12). *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; (*) p < .1 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 Taken together, the results of our analyses suggest the following: First, the fact that 
there is significant variation in populist communication between the countries underlines the 
relevance of factors operating at the country level. Among them are elements of journalistic 
culture that clearly matter for the extent of populist communication. In particular, a 
predominance of pedagogical motivations in the role orientation of journalists, acts as a brake 
for using populist messages in news coverage. Journalists who see themselves primarily as 
educators for their audience, filter out populist statements from their articles. Normatively, this 
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behavior can be assessed from two directions: On one hand, it can be welcomed as a 
contribution by socially responsible media who seek to contribute to the rationalization of 
social discourse and who do not wish to promote populist simplifications (or political actors 
who use them). However, it could also be critically questioned as an attempt to influence the 
public in which social discourses are narrowed down based on subjective convictions of media 
actors. Here we need comparative international follow-up studies in order to learn more about 
the motives of journalists and then to develop effective strategies for dealing with populists 
that are tailored to the individual countries. 
In contrast to pedagogical ambitions stand the influences of market-oriented, supportive 
and adversarial role perceptions. With regard to the latter role concepts in particular – 
supportive and adversarial – it is worth saying a little more. If journalists and political actors 
interact in an ambiance characterized by the journalistic understanding that the media should 
be facilitators of the government, the media are more permissive with respect to populist 
political messages. This is probably because journalists see the newspaper’s role more in acting 
as a passive carrier than an active gatekeeper of politicians’ pronouncements – even if populist 
in nature. The predominance of an adversarial journalistic culture, on the other hand, seems to 
motivate journalists to use more blunt, aggressive language towards elites – including populist 
statements – in editorials and commentaries.  
 Our second point of note from this study is that tabloids are not more prone to carry 
populist messages than broadsheets, despite tabloids’ efforts to popularize their content to the 
largest possible audience. Although found in other studies with different samples (e.g., 
Wettstein et al., 2018), a tabloids-meet-populism hypothesis is not confirmed by our data. We 
are not alone in rejecting this widespread assumption. We thus confirm similar findings of 
various smaller studies, for example those of Rooduijn (2014) and Akkerman (2011). 
According to our data, it is not a mass-market orientation at the level of the media organization 
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that spurs journalists’ use of populist communication. Rather, journalists’ strong preference for 
features of news logic increases their probability of incorporating populist messages in the 
same article. In particular, stories emphasizing political conflict and containing emotional cues, 
create favorable conditions for adding populist content. The fact that we could not find any 
significant differences between tabloids and broadsheets can also be interpreted as an incentive 
to take a closer look at how journalists deal with populist messages in their daily work. Future 
studies may need to examine more precisely how journalists use, construct, modify, and 
incorporate these messages – and how this looks in detail. For instance, it might be that tabloids 
and broadsheets do not differ in the sheer amount of populist content, but rather in the ways in 
which they present these populist messages, for example in headlines or visuals. 
 As a potential caveat of the analyses, we must consider that the style elements we 
assume to be independent variables somehow bear a natural resemblance to some of the 
populist messages, for example in utterances that contain keen criticism of the elite, or that set 
immigrants and the resident population against each other. So, one could argue as well that 
populist content is conducive to an emotional, negative, dramatic, or polarized style. Although 
it is hard to decide which triggers which in journalistic reporting by way of content analysis, 
we lean to the view that negativity, polarization etc., are broader frames for political stories 
that – in the sense of a favorable environment – increase the opportunity for populist messages 
to slip in as well. Therefore, we believe their conceptualization as an independent variable is 
justified. Another limitation is that we used a broad concept of anti-elitism, which we think is 
necessary to capture the cross-national variety of populist utterances. 
 Furthermore, from a bird’s eye view, the fact that we found strong differences between 
countries, is in line with other cross-cultural studies – such as those explaining the media 
coverage of the EU financial crisis – which also found a strong influence of national-level 
factors on reporting (Picard, 2015; Maurer, 2016). Similarly, the country was the strongest 
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predictor in a European study of national MP’s EU attitudes, outweighing the influence of their 
individual political leaning (Gaxie & Hubé, 2013). Thus, our findings perfectly align with other 
recent findings demonstrating a powerful role of the national context for how journalists 
understand and interpret political reality. The present study suggests that this impact also 
applies to the extent to which journalists include populist messages in immigration-related 
news stories and commentaries on political affairs. 
 Summing up, populism is not treated the same way in divergent national journalistic 
cultures. The differences, with respect to the degrees of populism in the coverage, are echoed 
by differences between parties to which this label is attached. For example, the differences 
between the degree of populism in France, and in Germany, could be explained in terms of the 
different stages in the development of these countries’ populist parties or movements. Whereas 
the Front National in France is an old phenomenon, the German Alternative fuer Deutschland 
was in its insurgent stage during the time of data collection. In more general terms, this means 
that instead of searching for a universal blueprint of the relationship between the media and 
populism that applies across Europe, we must think in terms of path-dependencies or national 
political and journalistic fields if we are to understand the relationship between media and 
populist actors.  
 The present study permits us to suppose that newspaper coverage of populist messages 
is more dependent on the political field structure and the shape of journalistic culture than on 
universal newspaper types in terms of tabloid or broadsheet. The clear association of media 
logic contained in a story and populist content which our analysis revealed aside, there is 
arguably less of a transnational pattern for how media deal with populist communication, then 
a national way that depends in part on the political and journalistic culture. This invites us to 
be much more cautious when comparing, not just populist communication, but media cultures 
and systems cross-nationally. Clearly there is a lot of heterogeneity in the way specific media 
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segments and genres operate across Europe, and it is often risky to put individual outlets in one 
basket (or under one label) and treat them equally, as our analysis has demonstrated once more. 
Therefore, this chapter finally argues for a more nuanced, culture-sensitive approach to cross-
national comparisons of journalistic cultures and their outcomes. 
 
References 
Akkerman, T. (2011). Friend or foe? Right-wing populism and the popular press in Britain 
and the Netherlands. Journalism, 12(8), 931-945. doi: 10.1177/1464884911415972 
Block, E., & Negrine, R. (2017). The populist communication style: Toward a critical 
framework. International Journal of Communication, 11, 178-197. 
Boomgaarden, H. G., & Vliegenthart, R. (2007). Explaining the rise of anti-immigrant 
parties: The role of news media content. Electoral Studies, 26(2), 404-417. doi: 
10.1016/j.electstud.2006.10.018 
Bos, L., van der Brug, W., de Vreese, C. (2010) Media coverage of right-wing populist 
leaders. Communications: The European Journal of Communication Research, 35(2), 141-
163. doi: 10.1515/comm.2010.008 
Bos, L., & Brants, K. (2014). Populist rhetoric in politics and media: A longitudinal study of 
the Netherlands. European Journal of Communication, 29(6), 703-719. doi: 
10.1177/0267323114545709 
Brants, K., De Vreese, C., Möller, J., & van Praag, P. (2010). The real spiral of cynicism? 
Symbiosis and mistrust between politicians and journalists. The International Journal of 
Press/Politics, 15(1), 25-40. doi: 10.1177/1940161209351005 
Donohue, G. A., Tichenor. P. J., and Olien, C. N. (1995). A guard dog perspective on the role 




Esser, F. (1999). 'Tabloidization' of news. A comparative analysis of Anglo-American and 
German press journalism. European Journal of Communication, 14(3), 291-324. doi: 
10.1177/0267323199014003001  
Esser, F., & Stępińska, A., & Hopmann, D. N. (2017). Populism and the media: Cross-
national findings and perspectives. In T. Aalberg, F. Esser, C. Reinemann, J. Strömbäck, 
& C. H. de Vreese (Eds.) Populist political communication in Europe (pp. 365-380). 
London, UK: Routledge. 
Hanitzsch, T. (2011). Populist disseminators, detached watchdogs, critical change agents and 
opportunist facilitators: Professional milieus, the journalistic field and autonomy in 18 
countries. International Communication Gazette, 73(6), 477-494. doi: 
10.1177/1748048511412279 
Hanitzsch, T., Hanusch, F., Mellado, C., Anikina, M., Berganza, R., Cangoz, I., . . . Kee 
Wang Yuen, E. (2011). Mapping journalism cultures across nations. Journalism Studies, 
12(3), 273-293. doi: 10.1080/1461670X.2010.512502 
Hubé, G. D. N., & Gaxie, D. (2012). Elites’ views on European institutions: National 
experiences sifted through ideological orientations. In H. Best, G. Lengyel, & L. 
Verzichelli (Eds.), The Europe of elites: A study into the Europeanness of Europe's 
political and economic elites (pp. 122-146), Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press Oxford. 
Jagers, J., & Walgrave, S. (2007). Populism as political communication style: An empirical 
study of political parties' discourse in Belgium. European Journal of Political Research, 
46(3), 319-345. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00690.x 
Kioupkiolis, A. (2016). Podemos: The ambiguous promises of left-wing populism in 




Krämer, B. (2014). Media populism: A conceptual clarification and some theses on its 
effects. Communication Theory, 24(1), 42-60. doi: 10.1111/comt.12029 
Manucci, L., & Weber, E. (2017). Why the big picture matters: Political and media populism 
in Western Europe since the 1970s. Swiss Political Science Review, 23(4), 313-334. doi: 
10.1111/spsr.12267 
Maurer, P. (2016). L’avenir de l’intégration européenne dans les commentaires des journaux 
de prestige français et allemands: Deux vues convergentes? In P. J. Maarek (Ed.), La 
communication politique des Européennes de 2014: pour ou contre l’Europe? (pp.161-
173). Paris, France: L’Harmattan. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2003). The media and the growth of neo-populism in contemporary 
democracies. In: G. Mazzoleni, J. Stewart, & B. Horsfield (Eds.), The media and neo-
populism: A contemporary comparative analysis (pp. 1-20). Westport, CT: Praeger. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2007). Populism and the media. In D. Albertazzi & D. McDonnell (Eds.), 
Twenty-first century populism: The spectre of Western European democracy (pp. 49-64). 
London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2008). Media logic. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), The International Encyclopedia of 
Communication (Vol. VII, pp. 2930-2932). Malden, MA: Blackwell. 
Mazzoleni, G. (2014). Mediatization and political populism. In F. Esser & J. Strömback 
(Eds.), Mediatization of politics (pp. 42-56). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
McNeish, D., Stapleton, R. L., & Silverman, R. D. (2016). On the unnecessary ubiquity of 
hierarchical linear modeling. Psychological Methods. Advanced online publication. doi: 
10.1037/met0000078. 
Pfetsch, B., Maurer, P., Mayerhöffer, E., & Moring, T. (2014). A hedge between keeps 
friendship green: Concurrence and conflict between politicians and journalists in nine 
30 
 
European democracies. In M. J. Canel & K. Voltmer (Eds.), Comparing political 
communication across time and space (pp. 172-191). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Picard R. (Ed.). (2015). The Euro crisis in the media: Journalistic coverage of economic 
crisis and European institutions. London, UK: I.B. Taurus. 
Raycheva, L. & Peicheva D. (2017). Populism in Bulgaria between politicization of media 
and mediatization of politics. Mediatization Studies, 1(1), 69-81. 
Rooduijn, M. (2014). The mesmerising message: The diffusion of populism in public debates 
in Western European media. Political Studies, 62(4), 726-744. doi: 10.1111/1467-
9248.12074 
Sarikakis, K. (2012). ‘Crisis’ ‘Democracy’ ’Europe’: terms of contract? Framing public 
debates of the crisis. Paper for the Workshop of the Austrian Research Association “The 
Financial Crisis of the 21st Century”, Vienna, Austria, 18-19 October 2012. 
Snijders, T., & Bosker, R. (1999). Multilevel analysis: An introduction to basic and applied 
multilevel analysis. London, UK: Sage. 
Stavrakakis, Y., & Katsambekis, G. (2014). Left-wing populism in the European periphery: 
the case of SYRIZA. Journal of Political Ideologies, 19(2), 119-142. doi: 
10.1080/13569317.2014.909266 
Tomov, M. & Raycheva L. (2018). Populist approach to migration in the contemporary 
media ecosystem. Rhetoric and Communications E-journal, 33, March 2018. Retrieved 
from http://rhetoric.bg/populist-approaches-to-migration-in-the-contemporary-media-
ecosystem-mariyan-tomov-lilia-raycheva 
Wettstein, M., Esser, F., Schulz, A., Wirz, D., & Wirth, W. (2018). News media as 
gatekeepers, critics and initiators of populist communication: How journalists in ten 
countries deal with the populist challenge. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18, 
1-20. doi: 10.1177/1940161218785979 
31 
 
Worlds of Journalism Study (WJS) (2016). Data and key tables. Retrieved 12.7.2018 from 
http://www.worldsofjournalism.org/research/2012-2016-study/data-and-key-tables/ 
1 We had to deviate from this line for France because not enough political journalists could be identified in the 
WJS data set; for that reason, we did our calculations with the entire French sample.  
2 The tendency reported here is further corroborated by a positive correlation (r = .39, p = .23) between 
populism, and an index measuring market-orientation of journalists (which is called “accommodative role” in 
the Worlds of Journalism study). 
3 Taking into account that national journalism cultures may be even better reflected by the aggregate role 
conceptions of all kinds of journalists (not only political), we also ran the correlations with values for the whole 
journalistic workforce. These correlations were all in the same direction as those with the values for political 
journalists, yet constantly lower. This supports our initial argument that there should be a stronger relationship 
between features of political coverage, and the professional orientations of journalists specializing in political 
reporting. 
4 In the immigration sample, tabloids harbor on average less than half a populist message per news article (0.42), 
while quality papers contain slightly more (0.53). The difference is however not statistically significant. With 
regards to opinion pieces, the average number of populist messages is 0.88 of a message for both types of 
newspapers. 
                                                          
View publication stats
